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THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE: WHY EARLY WARNING FAILED 
Gregory H. STANTON1 
Abstract: Early warnings of the Rwandan genocide were ignored because policy makers perceived it as 
a "civil war," denied the facts, and decided not to intervene, preventing US and UN lawyers from calling 
the killing "genocide." Early reinforcement of UNAMIR could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives, 
but "group-think" precluded consideration of direct military intervention by the US and allied forces, though 
they were near Rwanda and rescued their own nationals. Unwilling to financially and militarily support a 
reinforced UNAMIR, the U.S., U.K. and U.N. , the Security Council ordered UNAMIR to leave Rwanda; 
because they did not consider Rwandan lives worth saving at the risk of their own troops. 
There were plenty of "early warnings" of the Rwandan genocide, but they were 
systematically ignored. The best book on the Rwandan genocide, Linda Melvern's 
superb A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda's Genocide. sets them 
forth in detail. To list just a few, in the spring of 1992, the Belgian ambassador in Kigali, 
Johan Swinner warned his government that the Akazu, a secret group of Hutu Power 
advocates organized around President Habyarimana's wife, "is planning the 
extermination of the Tutsi of Rwanda to resolve once and for all , in their own way, the 
ethnic problem .. .. " 2 In October 1992, Professor Filip Reyntjens organized a press 
conference in the Belgian Senate in which he described how Hutu Power death squads 
were operating and named their leaders, including Colonel Theoneste Bagasora, who 
.later coordinated the genocide. 3 In March 1993, four human rights groups led by 
Human Rights Watch and the International Federation of Human Rights issued a report 
on mass killings in Rwanda. Although the word "genocide" was excised from the final 
report, the press release announcing it, written by Canadian law professor William 
1President, The International Association of Genocide Scholars. President, Genocide Watch. James 
Farmer Professor in Human Rights, The University of Mary Washington, Fredericksburg, Virginia 22401 -
5358, USA. Fellow, 2001 - 2002, The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
genocidewatch@aol.com. This article is directly edited from, "Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been 
Prevented?" published in the Journal of Genocide Research, Volume 6, Number 2, June 2004, at 211 . 
The adaptation has been made by the author, who retains the copyright to this work. © 2008 Gregory 
Stanton. 
2 Belgian Senate, Commission d'enquete parlementaire concernant les evenements du Rwanda, Rapport, 
6 December 1997, p. 493. Quoted in Melvern, Linda, A People Betrayed. The Role of the West in 
Rwanda's Genocide, Zed Books, London, 2000, p.49. 
3 Prunier, Gerard, The Rwanda Crisis 1959- 1994, History of a Genocide, London, Hurst and Company, 
1995, p. 168. 
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Schabas, used the word genocide to describe the mass killings of Tutsis.4 The U.N. 
Special Rapporteur on Summary, Arbitrary, and Extrajudicial Executions, B.W. Ndiaye, 
conducted a mission to Rwanda in April 1993 and reported to the U.N. Human Rights 
Commission in August 1993 that the trial massacres of Tutsis, already begun by then, 
constituted genocide under the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide (UNCG).5 
During the months prior to the Rwandan genocide, General Romeo Dallaire, 
commander of the U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR), warned the U.N. 
Department of Peacekeeping Operatiqns (DPKO) that Hutu extremists were planning a 
campaign to exterminate Tutsis. In a now famous cable to New York on January 11, 
1994, which DPKO authorized him to share with the U.S., French and Belgian 
Embassies, General Dallaire asked for authority to search for and seize the caches of 
machetes and other weapons that had been shipped into Rwanda for the Hutu militias, 
the lnterahamwe.6 Iqbal Riza, deputy to then Undersecretary General for Peacekeeping 
Kofi Annan, in a letter signed by Annan, denied him permission to act, as it exceeded 
UNAMIR's mandate, and instructed him instead to take the information to the Rwandan. 
government, many of whose members were planning the genocide. DPKO's refusal to 
authorize action was confirmed on January 14 by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali 
himself.? 
It is significant that General Dallaire's famous cable warning to the UN DPKO of the 
coming genocide was entitled, "Request for Protection of Informant." General Dallaire's 
informant asked to be evacuated from Rwanda, possibly after temporary asylum in a 
foreign embassy.s UN DPKO rejected the General's plan. Thereafter, the informant, 
who was personally opposed to the extermination plan, understandably stopped 
informing UNAMIR about it. Physical protection of moderates is among the most 
4 International Federation of Human Rights, Africa Watch (Human Rights Watch), Inter-African Union of 
Human Rights, and International Centre of Rights of the Person and of Democratic Development. Report 
of the International Commission of Investigation of Human Rights Violations in Rwanda since October 1, 
1990 (January 7- 21, 1993), New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993. 
s Ndiaye, B.W., Report by Special Rapporteur on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, 
Commission on Human Rights, U.N. Economic and Social Council document EICN.4/199417/Add.1, 11 
August 1993, p. 23. 
s Dallaire, Romeo, Cable to General Baril, UNDPKO, 11 January 1994, in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, 
Astri (eds.), The Path of A Genocide. The Rwanda Crisis from Uganda to Zaire, London: Transaction 
Publishers, p. xxi. 
7 Des Forges, Alison, Leave None To Tell The Story, Genocide in Rwanda, Human Rights Watch & FIDH, 
New York, 1999, p. 154. 
s Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.), note 6. 
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important steps that can be taken to prevent genocide at this stage. The UN refused to 
do even that, although it was clearly within UNAMIR's mandate. 
General Dallaire 's early warning of genocide was corroborated by the assassinations 
and further trial massacres of January to March 1994, which were also reported in 
cables to the U.S. State and Defense Departments.9 On January 21-22, UNAMIR 
seized a planeload of Belgian arms (shipped on a French plane) purchased by the 
Rwandan Armed Forces, which were then kept in joint UNAMIR/Rwandan government 
custody.1o At the request of DPKO, Dallaire provided confirmation of arms shipments 
and was finally authoriLed by the DPKO on February 3, 1994 to "assist the government 
of Rwanda" in recovering illegal arms. In mid-February, the Rwandan Minister of 
Defense requested landing authorization for three planes carrying arms, but General 
Dallaire refused. On February 27, General Dallaire repeated his request to DPKO for 
authorization to seize the caches of weapons the lnterahamwe militias had hidden all 
over Rwanda. (General Dallaire had sent a Senegalese UNAMIR soldier to see some of 
the arms caches with his own eyes.) U.N. authorities, including his direct superior, 
Canadian General Maurice Baril, again refused, referring privately to General Dallaire 
as a "cowboy" (inferring that he was reckless in suggesting such an action). 
Belgium explicitly warned the U.N. Secretary General of impending genocide on 
February 25, 1994, but Belgium's plea for a stronger U.N. peacekeeping force was 
rebuffed by members of the U.N. Security Council, particularly the U.S. and the United 
Kingdom. 11 Having studied genocidal processes and the history of genocidal 
massacres in Rwanda, I recognized, during my first stay in Rwanda in 1988, when I did 
a study of judicial administration for the Rwandan Ministry of Justice, the danger of the 
ethnic ID cards that everyone in Rwanda was required to carry on their person at all 
times. I had dinner with Joseph Kavaruganda, President of the Cour de Cassation 
(Supreme Court), and we agreed that the designation of ethnicity had to be removed 
from the ID cards. I met with President Habyarimana several weeks later and urged him 
directly to issue new ID cards without the ethnic designation. "Someday they will be 
used for genocide," I told him. He remained impassive and non-committal. Others also 
urged abolition of the ethnic ID's, and that reform was included in the Arusha peace 
agreement signed in August 1993. New ID cards were even printed. But they were 
·never issued. Hutu Power advocates wanted the ethnic designation retained . We now 
9 Des Forges (ct. note 7), pp. 159 -171 . 
1o Des Forges (ct. note 7), pp. 156-157. 
11 Alan J. Kuperman, The Limits of Humanitarian lnteNention. Genocide in Rwanda, The Brookings 
Institution Press, Washington, D.C. , 2001 : p. 85. · 
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know why. During the genocide, ID cards became facilitators of killing, because they 
permitted the killers to quickly determine who was Tutsi. Those who refused to show 
their ID's at lnterahamwe roadblocks were presumed to be Tutsi unless they could 
quickly prove otherwise. Nearly all Tutsis were immediately murdered. 
In Rwanda, the dehumanization of Tutsis had already been a feature of genocidal 
massacres in 1959, 1962, and 1972. In December 1990, the Hutu Power hate 
newspaper, Kangura, published the "Ten Commandments of the Hutu." They included 
the injunction, "The Bahutu should stop having mercy on the Batutsi." The Ten 
Commandments called for continuation of the Habyarimana government's policy that 
the army be exclusively Hutu, and that officers be prohibited from marrying Tutsi 
women. Cartoons and articles in Kangura referred to Tutsis as cockroaches and 
snakes, and regularly expounded the myth that they had invaded from Ethiopia. Tutsis 
were "devils" who ate the vital organs of Hutus. Twenty other extremist newspapers also 
published regular hate propagaoda against Tutsis.1 2 Radio Television Libres des Milles 
Coll ines amplified the hate propaganda from 1993 onward, and brought it to every 
corner of Rwanda using repeater antennae provided by Radio Rwanda, the government 
network. 
David Rawson, the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda, said RTLMC's euphemisms were 
subject to various interpretations and he defended its right to broadcast as "freedom of 
speech." 13 (This same misunderstanding of constitutional law was still prevalent in the 
State Department when I began work on Rwanda in July 1994. The public affairs officer 
responsible for U.S. policy on Rwanda explained that this was why the U.S. opposed 
jamming RTLMC. I explained, as a former law professor, that incitement to commit 
genocide is not "protected speech ." Indeed if there were ever a case that met the "clear 
and present danger" test of U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence, this was it.) 
After the RPF invasion in October 1990, the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces Armees 
Rwandaises or FAR), the aii-Hutu government army, expanded almost overnight from 
5,000 to 28,000 men .14 It got considerable assistance in training and arms from the 
French government. President Mitterand's son, Jean-Christophe, headed the Africa 
office at the Elysee Palace, and was a close friend of President Habyarimana. He was 
reputed to own a plantation in Rwanda and to be personally involved in the arms 
12 Kakwenzire, Joan and Kamukama, Dixon, "The Development and Consolidation of Extremist Forces in 
Rwanda 1990 -1994," in: Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (ct. note 6), p. 76. 
13 Melvern (ct. note 2), p. 71 . 
14 Melvern (ct. note 2), p. 33. 
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trade. 15 600 French paratroopers secretly took control of the counter-insurgency 
campaign. 16 The Egyptian government, with the intervention of Foreign Minister 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, sold $5.9 million in ammunition, rifles, mortar bombs,. rockets, 
and rocket launchers to Rwanda on 28 October 1990.17 South African arms dealers 
were also a major source. Between 1990 and April 1994, Rwanda spent an estimated 
$112 million on arms, making it the third largest arms purchaser in Africa, only after oil-
rich Nigeria and Angola.18The purchases were likely made with money diverted from 
loans by the World Bank.19 
It was the organization of extremist militias, however, that marked the organizational 
turn toward genocide. In 1992, the lnterahamwe, the militia of the ruling MRND party, 
was organized. It was soon followed by the lmpuzamugambi, the militia of the CRD, an 
extreme Hutu Power party organized by the Akazu elite to make the President's MRND 
seem moderate by comparison. These militias were secretly trained in camps run by 
Rwandan army officers, armed with machetes, Kalashnikovs, and grenades from arms 
shipments to the government. 
By 1992, Rwandan moderates had formed several opposition parties and had won 
seats in the National Assembly. On 6 April 1992, Agathe Uwilingiyimana, a moderate 
Hutu, was named Minister of Education. When she proposed ending the quota system 
that restricted Tutsi access to higher education, she was attacked in her home by twenty 
armed men. 2o In November 1993, after she had been named Prime Minister in the 
government formed after the signing of the Arusha Accords, Radio Television Libre Des 
Milles Collines publicly called for her assassination. She was one of the first officials to 
be murdered during the genocide on April 7. (Her ten Belgian UNAMIR guards were 
also slaughtered.) Kangura and RTLMC called anyone who opposed Hutu Power an 
"accomplice" of the Tutsis and a secret ally of the R.P.F. 
Joseph Kavaruganda, President of the Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court), another 
moderate Hutu, was also targeted by the extremists. In January 1994, the head of the 
lnterahamwe in Rugendo threatened Kavaruganda, and he complained to the President 
on January 15. On February 21 , thugs broke into the Supreme Court building and did 
15 Kakwenzire, Joan and Kamukama, Dixon, in: Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri (eds.) (ct. note 6), 
p. 83. 
16 Melvern (cf. note 2), p.31. 
17 Melvern (cf. note 2), p. 31 . 
1a Melvern (cf. note 2), p. 32, 67. 
19 Melvern (cf. note 2) , p. 67-68. 
2o Melvern (ct. note 2), p. 46-47. 
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considerable damage. On March 19, 1994, Captain Pascal Simbiyangwa warned 
Justice Kavaruganda's guards that the judge was a "cockroach" whose days were 
numbered and that the group who would kill him had already been chosen. On March 
23, 1994, an lnterahamwe, Enoch Kayonde, told Justice Kavaruganda he could be killed 
at any time. On the same day, Kavaruganda wrote a letter to President Habyarimana 
informing him of these death threats and asking for protection against the Presidential 
Guard .21 His pleas were to no avail. Justice Joseph Kavaruganda, my personal friend, 
was murdered on the first day of the genocide. 
Trial massacres began in Rwanda soon after the Rwandan Patriotic Front invaded in 
1990. Hutus slaughtered 300 Tutsi civilians in Kabirira in October 1990. In January 
1991, 500 to 1000 Tutsi were murdered in Kinigi. In March 1992, 300 Tutsi were 
massacred by Hutu militias in Bugesera. No one was ever arrested for these crimes, 
and there were no demands from international diplomats for such arrests. But the 
diplomatic community knew about the crimes. Cables from the U.S. Embassy in 
February 1994 described the lnterahamwe massacre of 70 Tutsis in Kigali between 
February 22 and 26. On March 1, 1994, the Belgian ambassador reported that station 
RTLMC was broadcasting "inflammatory statements calling for hatred - indeed for 
extermination ."22 
When Did U.S. Diplomats and Policymakers Know the Mass Murder was 
Genocide? 
Although the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency (D. I.A.} recognized from radio intercepts 
as early as April 7 that centrally organized mass killing of Tutsis was underway, D.I.A. 
warnings went unheeded in the American government. Some U.S. diplomats in Kigali 
began calling the killings genocide on first day, and directly communicated their views to 
the U.S. State Department in Washington, DC. The U.S. Embassy's Deputy Chief of 
Mission, Joyce Leader, has told me personally that she began using the word genocide 
in her daily telephone calls to the State Department from the start. It was clear to her 
that the lnterahamwe and Presidential Guard were committing genocide. Although these 
reports were shared with top officials, including Assistant Secretaries and other policy 
makers, at their daily interagency secure teleconferences about the Rwandan 
catastrophe, other reports from the U.S. Ambassador to Rwanda and the C.I.A. 
21 Copies of this letter is in the Melvern archive at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, and with Gregory 
Stanton, who may be reached at genocidewatch@aol.com. 
22 Caplan, Gerald, Rwanda. The Preventable Genocide, The Report of the International Panel of Eminent 
Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda and the Surrounding Events, Organization of 
African Unity, 1998. 
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contradicted them.23 The surfeit of information served to cloud rather than clarify the 
situation. 
Refusal to Invoke the G-Word 
Why did policy makers at the State Department and National Security Council refuse to 
recognize that genocide was underway in Rwanda? There are probably two reasons, 
both compelled by an already ordered group decision to avoid U.S. involvement. 
First, the facts were resisted . The U.S. government was forewarned of the impending 
genocide. Communications were sent by cable, e-mail, and secure telephone from the 
U.S. embassy in Kigali informing the State Department about General Dallaire's 
premonitions months before April 6. But in 1993, President Clinton had ordered U.S. 
forces withdrawn from Somalia after General Aideed's militia (possibly trained by 
Osama bin Laden's AI Queda) killed eighteen U.S. Army Rangers. Policy makers in 
Washington, D.C., especially Anthony Lake, Dick Clarke and Susan Rice at the National 
Security Council, George Ward at the State Department, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 
the Defense Department, distrusted U.N. peacekeeping missions and did not want the 
U.S. to get involved in another African "civil war," another "quagmire." In response to 
Somalia, President Clinton had just signed Presidential Decision Directive 25, which the 
same policy makers had drafted, limiting U.S. involvement in U.N. peacekeeping 
operations. But it specifically allowed such intervention in cases of "genocide." They 
therefore resisted the "cognitive dissonance" of reports of impending genocide in 
Rwanda, which might have created at least a moral duty to intervene. The anti-
interventionists dismissed General Dallaire's reports as "unconfirmed," meaning that 
U.S. embassy staff or intelligence personnel had not independently written about the 
arms caches and reported them through official cable channels. 
Those resisting use of the "G-word" utilized cable reports from the American 
ambassador, David Rawson, in the early days of the genocide, to argue that what was 
taking place in Rwanda was just another episode of bi-lateral civil war, not a one-sided 
genocide. Ambassador Rawson had grown up in Burundi with the Tutsi- Hutu conflict 
23 Joyce Leader lived next door to Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was murdered on the first 
day in a nearby UNDP compound after failing in her desperate efforts to scale the wall to Leader's 
compound. Members of the Presidential Guard invaded Leader's house searching for Prime Minister 
Uwilingiyimana. The prime minister was a moderate Hutu who opposed the Hutu Power conspirators. 
The Rwandan Army at Camp Kigali then murdered ten Belgian soldiers who had been dispatched to 
protect the prime minister. The murders were an intentional terror tactic to convince Belgium to withdraw 
its troops, a tactic that succeeded brilliantly. 
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and he spoke Kirundi, the language of Burundi, which is closely related to Kinyarwanda, 
the language of Rwanda. The Ambassador's appraisal of the violence, however 
confused it was, therefore carried considerable credibility. After the entire U.S. mission 
left for Burundi on April10, with Ambassador Rawson in the last car, no further official 
channels existed to "confirm" reports from Kigal i. The first defense against action to 
prevent the mass killing was denial of the facts. 
The second reason for inaction was legal malpractice. The State Department Bureau of 
African Affairs asked the State Department Legal Advisor's office whether the 
massacres constituted genocide. On April 26, Carl Pendorff issued an intelligence 
estimate calling the Rwandan massacres genocide. At a crucial interagency meeting 
called by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Prudence Bushnell, she asked, "Is this 
genocide? And if it is, what are we going to do about it?" Ms. Joan Donoghue of the 
Legal Advisors Office gave her opinion that the word genocide should be avoided, 
because she questioned whetber the killings possessed the requisite "intent" and 
because use of the G-word, "genocide" would obligate the U.S. to take action to stop it. 
Her oral opinion was soon followed by a written opinion from the Legal Advisor saying 
the same things. 
Sadly, the lawyers were wrong on both points. Intent can be proven by direct 
statements, but it is more often inferred from actions, like the systematic pattern of 
killing of Tutsis in Rwanda. And unfortunately, the Genocide Convention imposes no 
legal requirement to take action to stop a genocide. It only requires passage of national 
legislation to outlaw genocide, 24 and prosecution or extradition of suspected 
perpetrators .2s The Convention 's Article 8 states, "Contracting Parties may call upon the 
competent organs of the U.N." to take action to suppress a genocide. But that is not 
legally required . 
For over two months, the Legal Advisors told the U.S. government not to call the 
Rwandan killings genocide. The State Department ordered the U.S. mission at the U.N. 
to vigorously oppose use of the term. The U.K. rewrote a Presidential Statement 
proposed on April 29 by New Zealand's Colin Keating, that month's President of the UN 
Security Council, to avoid use of the word. On May 4, the U.N. Secretary General 
declared a "real genocide."26 
24 Genocide Convention, Article 5. 
2s Genocide Convention, Articles 5- 7. 
26 Melvern (cf. note 2), p. 190. 
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The U.S. continued to avoid the G-word until June. In a now infamous press 
conference on June 10, U.S. State Department press spokesperson Christine Shelley, 
reading from talking points prepared by the Legal Advisors, declared that "acts of 
genocide have occurred in Rwanda." But when pressed by a reporter, she was 
unprepared to call it "genocide." This false distinction was finally buried the same day by 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, himself a lawyer, who knew that Article 2 of the 
Genocide Convention defines genocide as acts of genocide. An act of genocide !§. 
genocide, just as an act of rape is rape, or an act of murder, murder. The U.S. Secretary 
of State finally called it genocide on June 10, after most of the killing was over. 
State Department lawyers and policy makers did not want to use the G-word because 
they wanted to avoid a duty to act. So they chose another name for what was 
happening in Rwanda, one that would result in non-intervention: "civil war." Civil wars 
are two-sided (or multi-sided.). The lesson the Clinton Administration learned from 
Somalia was, "don't get involved in African civil wars." Policy makers, including U.S. 
Ambassador David Rawson in Kigali, saw the killing as a continuation of the civil war 
that had plagued Rwanda since 1990, a war the Arusha Accords were supposed to 
settle. What they missed was the turn ·toward genocide of the Hutu Power movement. 
Because they did not know much about genocide, they ignored the fact that most 
genocides have been committed during wars, including civil wars. Robert Melson has 
shown in Revolution and Genocide that it is precisely during wars that pariah groups are 
most likely to become identified as threats, and therefore objects of genocide. 27 
Genocide and civil war are correlative, not mutually exclusive. The second defense 
against action was legal definitionalism - denial that mass murder fit the legal definition 
of genocide. 
The press and human rights groups also failed to name the crime until two weeks into 
the genocide. French newspapers were an exception. The first newspaper that called it 
genocide was Liberation in an article by Jean-Philippe Ceppi on April 11, 1994. 
Liberation had also been the first to use the word "genocide" in an early warning article 
about death squads in Rwanda in February 1993. But the left-wing Liberation is not 
given much weight by French foreign policy makers, and is not read, by anyone in 
Washington. Le Monde followed with a story by Jean Helene on April12. It, too, was 
ignored. Human rights groups held back until Ken Roth, Executive Director of Human 
Rights Watch, wrote Colin Keating, President of the U.N. Security Council on April 19. 
The Pope waited to call it genocide until April 27. 
27 Melson, Robert, Revolution and Genocide, University of Chicago Press, 1992, p. 273. 
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What the U.N. Did and What It Might Have Done 
The U.N. did not wait to intervene in Rwanda until the beginning of the genocide. Acting 
under Chapter VI of the U.N. Charter, the U.N. Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
had deployed 2,539 U.N. Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) troops to Rwanda 
by April 6, 1994.28 From the beginning of his mission, UNAMIR Commander General 
Romeo Dallaire argued that UNAMIR needed heavier weapons, and a minimum of 
4,500 troops, all of them well-trained and well- supplied, with a clear mandate giving 
them authority to forcefully stop killing. That could have been written into U.N. Security 
Council Resolution 872 that created UNAMIR. But the U.S. and U.K. had opposed a 
robust mandate with the 4,500 troops recommended by General Dallaire because it 
would have been too expensive. 29 
When the genocide began, policy makers in Washington, D.C. and at the U.N. believed 
that UNAMIR forces lacked the ~trength to arrest the spread of the conflagration, and 
they refused to consider sending in their own troops. In U.S. government parlance, such 
an option was a "non-starter." When that word is used, it really means, "We don't want 
to think about it." It is the product of what social scientists have called "group-think." 
Those who dissent are afraid to step forward to challenge the group assumptions. State 
Department policymakers who attended a crucial meeting in the International 
Organization Affairs bureau on UNAMIR's future have told me that after Assistant 
Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose, National Security Council 
Peacekeeping Advisor Susan Rice, and International Organizations Deputy Assistant 
Secretary George Ward had all agreed that UNAMIR could not fulfill its mandate and 
should be withdrawn, they felt as subordinates that they could not object or contradict 
them, a classic case of "group-think." 
U.S. policy makers did not consider changing UNAMIR's mandate because they 
assumed that troop-contributors had only committed to a peacekeeping operation, not 
an operation to stop genocide. No one suggested asking the troop-contributors if they 
would stay. No one even suggested sending in U.S. troops. That was a "non-starter," 
not an option on the table. The U.N. Security Council's earlier failure, because of U.S. 
and U.K. reluctance, to send a strong UNAMIR force created the self-fulfilling prophecy 
that nothing effective could be done. 
2a Melvern (ct. note 2), p.106. 
29 Melvern (ct. note 5), p. 85. 
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In the U.N. Security Council, the U.S. took an active stance against keeping the 
UNAMIR troops in Rwanda. Ambassador Karl lnderfurth announced that position on 
April 15 in "lnformals," secret closed meetings of the Security Council, with the 
representative of the genocidal Rwandan regime present. Ambassador lnderfurth's 
announcement of U.S. policy had fatal consequences. The next day, the Rwandan 
Interim Government met, and knowing it could now act with impunity, decided to extend 
the genocide to Southern Rwanda. 3D 
In the first week of the genocide, General Dallaire asked for a change in UNAMIR's 
mandate that would authorize him to take action to stop as much killing as possible. But 
instead, on April 21 , the Security Council, led by the U.S. and the U.K., ordered a 
reduction of UNAMIR to a token force of 270 troops.31 Over 500,000 Rwandan Tutsis 
were murdered while the U.N . "did a Pontius Pilate," as General Dallaire told State 
Department officials in Fall 1994.32 
Would an UNAMIR Intervention Have Saved Lives? 
How many lives could have been saved? We will never know. But General Dallaire, the 
commander on the ground who knew the situation best, was, and still is, convinced that 
a robust UNAMIR mandate, plus reinforcements, demonstrating the international 
political will to stop further genocide, could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. 
The troops General Dallaire asked for were immediately available. Over 1 ,000 heavily 
armed French and Belgian troops fiew into Kigali by April 10 to evacuate their own 
nationals. If they had, instead, been used to reinforce UNAMIR, they might have had a 
powerful effect in deterring the spread of the genocide. An additional 500 Belgian 
reserves were available in Kenya, and 800 more French troops were stationed in central 
Africa.33 Two hundred and fifty U.S. Special Operations troops stood by in Burundi to 
assist, if necessary, with the evacuation of U.S. citizens. There were also tens of 
30 Melvern (ct. note 2), p. 163. 
31 U.N. Security Council Resolution S/Res/912 (1994), 21 April1994. See also Des Forges (ct. note 7), 
p. 631 . 
32 Dr. Kuperman disputes the commonly accepted death toll of 800,000, claiming that Rwanda's pre-
genocide Tutsi population was only 650,000, 8.27 percent of the population, based on the 1991 census. 
Kuperman (ct. note 11 }, p. 20. However, the most recent count of the dead, carried out locality by locality, 
yields a figure of over one million dead from 1990 through 1994, with 800,000 dead during the genocide. 
Associated Press, "More Than One Million Rwandans Killed in 1990's," NY Times Online News 
Report, 14 February, 2002. 
33 Melvern (ct. note 2), p. 147. Kuperman's figures are similar. 
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thousands of U.S. troops stationed in Europe, on ships off the East African coast in the 
lndian.Ocean, and other places much closer to Rwanda than the continental U.S.A. 
Even without these reinforcements, according to General Dallaire, the UNAMIR troops 
could have used the weapons they had, which were superior to the machetes of the 
lnterahamwe, to take down the roadblocks by force, and protect Tutsis who had 
gathered in defensible places. The fact that the remaining 456 UNAMIR peacekeepers 
were able to save at least 25,000 lives by guarding people who had gathered in 
churches, stadiums, and hotels, leaves the question open whether the full 2,500 
member force could not have saved many more lives had the U.N. Security Council 
immediately mandated it to do so. In places protected by the 456 UNAMIR volunteers 
who stayed, most people survived. Even against the better-armed Presidential Guard, a 
robust · response by UNAMIR might have deterred plans to extend the 
genocide. International outrage at attacks on U.N. peacekeepers might have also 
helped forge the political will n~cessary to obtain reinforcements. Instead, the U.N. 
Security Council, led by the U.S. and the U.K., decided to cut and run . As General 
Dallaire later told State Department officials, "a peacekeeping force that is trying to stop 
genocide must expect to take casualties, or it is worthless." 
The major problem from the beginning of UNAMIR was that all but one of the Western 
powers were unwilling to send troops to intervene, or even to provide airlift and 
financing for an international force. The result was that poorly trained troops from 
Bangladesh, lacking any equipment, were the largest contingent, followed by the 
Ghanaians, who arrived with enormous courage, but without a single vehicle. The 
Belgian force numbered only 420, and withdrew within days after the massacre of ten 
Belgian soldiers guarding the Prime Minister. As previously mentioned, the attack was 
consciously planned to drive out the Belgians.34 The Hutu Power militants had learned 
the lessons of Somalia, too. If you kill them, they will leave. 
Late in the genocide, France, which had supplied the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) 
with arms and advisors and may have helped train lnterahamwe militias, launched 
Operation Turquoise. After getting U.N. authorization3s, France sent in Senegalese and 
34 Dallaire, Romeo, Cable to General Baril, UNDPKO, 11 January 1994, in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, 
Astri (eds.) (cf. note 6), p. xxi. 
3s U.N. Security Council Resolution 929 (S/PV.3392) 22 June 1994. 
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French troops on June 23.36 Operation Turquoise saved more than 10,000 lives in 
western Rwanda, but also permitted the leaders of the genocide to escape into Zaire. 37 
What finally stopped the genocide was the victory by the Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF), which took Kigali on July 4 and declared a ceasefire on July 18. From July 14 to 
16, a million refugees streamed into Zaire, the fastest migration of people in history. 
Refugee camps quickly fell under the control of the Hutu lnterahamwe. Remnants of 
lnterahamwe forces have committed mass rape and mass murder in Eastern Congo 
ever since. The war that ensued in the Democratic Republic of the Congo has since 
cost over five million lives.3s 
Why Did Early Warning Fail and Why Did the U.S. and the U.N. Fail to Act? 
The major Western governments knew from the first days that mass killing was 
underway in Rwanda. The U.S. Deputy Chief of Mission used the word genocide in her 
calls to the State Department from the beginning. Much of the communication was done 
by secure phone calls, because both Joyce Leader and Ambassador Rawson were cut 
off from access to the U.S. Embassy for long periods. Classified documents confirm this 
very early recognition of mass killing. The information did reach the top levels of the 
U.S. government. 
The real problem was genocide denial, first through denial of the facts, and then through 
denial that the mass murder was genocide. State Department and Defense Department 
lawyers who were opposed to intervention, either because of their own views or to 
please their anti-interventionist superiors, denied that the mass murders constituted 
genocide. That this denial was intentional can be seen from the fact that they continued 
to deny the genocide for two months, until long after it was obvious to nearly everyone 
else that one of the worst genocides of the twentieth century was underway. 
General Dallaire and a panel of military experts assembled by the Carnegie 
Commission on Preventing Deadly Confiict concluded that it would not have taken 
weeks to put troops in place who could have significantly reduced the killings. Again, 
2,539 UNAMIR troops were already in Rwanda. Over 1,000 heavily armed airborne 
36 Melvern (cf. note 2), p. 213. 
37 Prunier, Gerard, "Operation Turquoise: A Humanitarian Escape," in Adelman, Howard and Suhrke, Astri 
{eds.) (cf. note 6), p. 303. 
38 International Rescue Committee, Crisis Watch, Special Report: Congo, January 2008, 
www.theirc.org/special-report/congo-forgotten-crisis.html. 
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troops from France, and Belgium were immediately available and did arrive by April10. 
Another 1,550 Belgian, French, and U.S. troops were in nearby African countries. The 
Carnegie Commission panel concluded that prompt international denunciation of the 
genocide, accompanied by forceful military resistance by UNAMIR and Western troops 
could have saved many lives, as Colonel Scott Feil argues convincingly in his book for 
the Carnegie Commission, Preventing Genocide: How The Early Use Of Force Might 
Have Succeeded In Rwanda.39 
The problem is that early warnings of "mere" civil war and massive civilian killing seldom 
result in international intervention, whereas early warnings of genocide might. But in 
Rwanda, except for a few who used the sacred "G-word," none dared call it genocide--
until it was too late. The Rwandan conflagration burned so fast that reacting after it 
started would, for most of its victims, have been too late. Within three weeks, at least 
300,000 lives had been consumed. 
Conclusions 
The Rwandan genocide could have been prevented 
The early warning signs were clear. UNAMIR troops were already on the ground in 
Rwanda, though with inadequate training and material support. But in a failure of 
political will , the U.S., the U.K., the U.N. Secretariat and the U.N. Security Council 
refused to act to prevent or stop the genocide. At least 500,000 and probably 800,000 
people perished. 
Two questions remain: 
(1) Why, with all the early warnings, did the U.S., U.K., France and the U.N. 
not do what needed to be done to prevent the Rwandan genocide?; and, 
(2) Why, once the genocide began, did the U.N. Security Council order 
UNAMIR to withdraw, rather than sending reinforcements to stop the 
genocide? 
39 Feil, Colonel Scott,"Prevemting Genocide: How the Early Use of Force Might Have Succeeded in 
Rwanda," Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, New York, April1998. 
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Lack of political will is at the heart of the answers to both questions. But to muster 
political will, governments must perceive and understand the crisis and have realistic 
options to resolve it. 
1. The early warnings were ignored 
In Rwanda, the U.N. DPKO and the U.S., as well as other governments, refused to 
discern the signs of genocide. Because they did not understand the genocidal process, 
they missed the early warning signs. There was, at the time, no systematic 
understanding among policy makers of how genocide develops so that the warning 
signs could be noticed. That is why, in 1996, I wrote a short policy paper for U.S. 
diplomats (now available on the Genocide Watch website) entitled "The Eight Stages of 
Genocide."40 That is, it was written in order to provide an explanatory model of the 
genocidal process, along with specific policy recommendations for what can be done to 
prevent and stop the process at each stage. 
2. After the genocide started, policy makers resisted and misconstrued the facts 
Misplaced hopes for the Arusha Accords led the U.S. Ambassador and diplomats to 
ignore the planning for genocide within the Rwandan government and the Hutu Power 
militias. · 
In the post-Somalia era, policy makers did not want to get involved in another African 
"quagmire," so they minimized the facts. The first cables from the U.S. Ambassador 
treated the killings as a bilateral continuation of the Rwandan civil war, rather than as a 
one-sided genocide. The number of deaths in the early weeks was grossly under-
estimated. Closure of embassies and withdrawal of personnel and press prevented 
adequate reporting on the genocide, especially "confirmed" reporting in official cables 
from embassy staff. Generally, policy makers require "confirmed" fact-finding before 
they will take action. 
3. Lawyers who did not understand the law refused to call it genocide 
Lawyers at the U.S. State and Defense departments and at the British Foreign Office 
had little training in the law of genocide. What knowledge they did have, they 
40Stanton, Gregory, "The Eight Stages of Genocide," at 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutgenocide/Bstagesofgenodde.html 
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misapplied. They created conceptual uncertainty among policy makers who relied upon 
them for advice. Their power to block policy determinations, press guidance, and 
· instruction cables saying that genocide was underway in Rwanda meant that for over 
two months the U.S. and U.K. refused to call the Rwandan genocide by its proper legal 
name. It also meant that the U.S. and U.K. refused to permit the U.N. Security Council 
to declare that genocide was being committed in Rwanda. Words, especially legal 
words, have consequences. During the Rwandan genocide, refusal to name it genocide 
meant that policy makers in denial could continue to obstruct action because they could 
argue there was no imperative to intervene. The lawyers even misconstrued the law on 
the duty to intervene, arguing that the Genocide Convention creates a legal, rather than 
simply a moral duty to do so. 
4. Group-think ruled out effective options for intervention 
When policy makers finally recognized the facts, they thought they had no acceptable 
options to prevent the genocide. , In the interagency policy meetings in the U.S. 
government, dispatch of U.S. troops was ruled out as a "non-starter," and was never 
seriously considered. UNAMIR was perceived as too weak and undersupplied to stop 
the rapidly spreading killing. U.S. or British airlift for UNAMIR re-supply and 
reinforcement was also ruled out because of danger to American and British personnel 
and because of fear that such a step would lead the U.S. and U.K. into another African 
"quagmire." 
Policy makers had not considered options available when the genocide started. They 
believed that UNAMIR's Chapter 6 mandate would have to be changed to Chapter 7 to 
permit intervention without the permission of the Rwandan interim government. General 
Dallaire has always rejected this contention because he asserts that UNAMIR's Chapter 
6 rules of engagement already authorized the use of force to protect civilian lives. They 
also ruled out asking UNAMIR troop contributors whether they would keep their troops 
in Rwanda under a changed mandate. Unfortunately, the U.S. and U.K. did not consider 
it feasible to change UNAMIR's mandate, though there was little chance of a veto by 
any of the other Permanent Five members of the Security Council. 
Those who engaged in group-think policy making also believed their responsibility would 
never be known. This paper is one small crack in the wall of bureaucratic 
irresponsibility. Books by Linda Melvern, Alison des Forges, Samantha Power, Michael 
Barnett, and Jared Cohen have done much more. Eventually, policy-makers need to 
know they will be held responsible for their decisions. 
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5. The U.S. was unwilling to financially or militarily support a reinforced UNAMIR 
Despite a Ghanaian offer to keep its troops in Rwanda, along with offers from several 
other African states to reinforce UNAMIR, the U.S. was unwilling to make the financial 
commitment to support an expanded operation. The U.S. and other military powers 
were unwilling to risk the lives of any of their own citizens. Instead they sacrificed the 
lives of 500,000 to 800,000 defenseless Rwandans. This U.S. position led the ever-
realistic U.K. to conclude that because U.S. approval in the Security Council would be 
necessary for sueh an intervention force, there was no possibility it would be approved; 
and hence, an endangered, undersupplied UNAMIR force should be withdrawn. 
1. Rwandan lives were not worth saving 
Although the U.S. and U.K. were willing to commit billions to save lives in Bosnia, where 
people are white, and the war was close to the interests of the European community, 
they were unwilling to do so in Rwanda, where people are black, and neither country 
has strategic or economic interests. This racist double-standard was pointed out 
repeatedly by Nigeria's Ambassador Gambari in the U.N. Security Council. Our circle of 
moral concern excluded people of a different race in a continent far away. We ignored 
our common humanity. 
Ultimately the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide was a political failure. Those 
with power failed to protect the powerless. The world still lacks the international 
institutions and the political will to stop genocide. To address this fundamental problem, 
as I suggested at a conference on genocide held in London in October 2000, a global 
movement is needed in the twenty-first century like the anti-slavery movement of the 
nineteenth century.41 To launch that movement is the purpose of Genocide Watch, The 
International Campaign to End Genocide, and the Interfaith Anti-Genocide Alliance.42 
41Stanton, Gregory,"How We Can Prevent Genocide," at 
http://www.genocidewatch.org/howpreventgenocide.html 
42 See http://www.genocidewatch.org/campaigntoendgenocide/about.html. 
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